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Abstract
In this paper,we consider the transparency of monetary policy in a New Key-
nesian model with misspeciﬁcation doubts. Model uncertainty allows us to identify
a new source of central bank opacity, which refers to a lack of information about
central bank’s preference for model robustness. Thus, taking into account this lack
of transparency, we study its impacts on macroeconomic variables. We show that
greater transparency can reduce the variability of output gap, inﬂation as well as
that of their expected values.
11 Introduction
The literature studying the eﬀects of monetary policy transparency on macroeconomic
performances (Cukierman (2001), Geraats (2002) and Eijﬃnger, Hoeberichts and Schal-
ing (2000)) assumes that the policymakers and the private agents know the true model of
the economy. Recent research (Levin and Williams (2003), Leitemo and Soderstrom
(2004),Walsh (2003)) has illustrated a renewed interest in monetary policy decision-
making by introducing model uncertainty. Policy makers want to make robust decisions
against potential misspeciﬁcations surrounding the model. We assume that the private
agents are aware of the fact that central bank sets its monetary policy according to its
preference for robustness. However, the central bank does not reveal all the information
to the private agents and they cannot, therefore, predict its preference for robustness.
Thus, the lack of transparency arises from the fact that there is asymmetric information
(poor communication) between the central bank and the private agents. In this context,
we identify two sources of uncertainty: ﬁrst, uncertainty concerning central bank prefer-
ence about model robustness and second, model uncertainty which comes from ignorance
of the true structure of the economy. In this framework, where the central bank faces
uncertainty about its model, the question is whether it is beneﬁcial to the policy maker
to reveal the value of the parameter which denotes the model robustness.
By applying robust control approach (Hansen and Sargent (2005)), we ﬁnd that greater
monetary policy transparency reduces the variability of output gap and inﬂation expecta-
tions. More precisely, the central bank can stabilize better the impact of shocks to private
agents’ expectations by revealing more information about its preference for robustness.
Therefore, output gap and inﬂation are less volatile.
1.1 The model
We consider a standard New-Keynesian model with sticky prices that summarizes the
economy in two equations: a New-Keynesian Phillips curve for inﬂation and a forward-
looking IS equation for output gap. According to Hansen and Sargent (2005), we incor-
porate robust control techniques by adding misspeciﬁcation terms and obtain the worst
case model as follows:
πt = Etπt+1 − axt + εt + ht, (1)
xt = Etxt+1 − b(it − Etπt+1) + ηt + wt, (2)
where πt is the rate of inﬂation, xt is the output gap, and it is the one-period nominal in-
terest rate controlled by the central bank. Etπt+1 and Etxt+1 are respectively the expected
inﬂation rate and the expected output gap of the next period based on the information
available in period t. εt denotes a cost-push shock and ηt is a demand shock. Both shocks
are assumed to be persistent and non correlated, following a ﬁrst order autoregressive
process:
εt = ρεt−1 + ξt, (3)
ηt = ψηt−1 + vt, (4)
with 0 ≤ ρ, ψ ≤ 1. The terms ξt, vt are i.i.d with zero mean and unity variance. ht and
wt are additional deterministic disturbances which introduce model uncertainty. These
2disturbances are supposed to be controlled by a ﬁctitious “evil agent” and represent the
policy maker’s worst fears concerning speciﬁcation errors.

















where the parameter χ can be considered as the budget allocated to the evil agent to
create misspeciﬁcations. To hedge against the worst scenario, the policy maker sets the
interest rate to minimize the value of its intertemporal loss function, while the evil agent
seeks to maximize the central bank’s loss, given both budget constraints. Incorporating
the misspeciﬁcations concerns into the decision making problem, the design of a robust























The parameter φ > 0 measures the weight that policy makers attach to inﬂation stabi-
lization relative to output stabilization and θ ∈ (1,∞] is a parameter which reﬂects the
central bank’s preference for model robustness. 1.
The issue of transparency arises when the public’s perception about the central bank’s
degree of model robustness ¯ θ diﬀers from the values that the bank itself actually considers
θ. Thus, the stochastic behaviour of the parameter θ is given by
θ = ¯ θ − µt,with Et(µt+1) = 0 and V ar(µ) = σ
2
θ. (8)
This implies that the public is correct on average, but may be mistaken when making
guesses about the central bank preferences for robustness in individual cases or at certain
points in time. σ2
θ measures the degree of opacity of the central bank. If the variance
of the preference shock σ2
θ increases (decreases), the central bank becomes less (more)
transparent respectively.
2 The solution of the model under discretion
Taking the ﬁrst order conditions for eq.(7) subject to equations (1) and (2), we can
derive the optimality conditions for inﬂation, output and the worst case misspeciﬁcation
as follows:





1The second order condition of Eq.(7) with respect to h shows that the evil agent’s problem is well
deﬁned and concave iﬀ θ > 1 Thus, θ = 1 is a lower bound for θ or a breakdown point(see Hansen and
Sargent, 2005).
3wt = 0. (11)
First, these optimality conditions show that the preference for robustness does not
aﬀect the optimal trade oﬀ between inﬂation and output in eq.(9). Second, the optimal
misspeciﬁcation in the IS equation is always zero since the central bank is able to neutralize
any speciﬁcation errors in the output equation by an appropriate adjustment of the interest
rate. These interest rate movements do not aﬀect the central bank loss and therefore, the
central bank does not fear such speciﬁcation errors (see Leitemo and Soderstrom (2004)).
Substituting now optimality conditions (9), (10) and (11) in the misspeciﬁed Phillips




(a2φ + 1)θ − φ

(Etπt+1 + εt). (12)
In order to determine the inﬂation rate, πt, we use the technique of undetermined
coeﬃcients 2. Since the relevant state variable in equation (12) is εt, it is apparent that
πt will be of the form:
πt = β0εt. (13)
Thus, using (3), we obtain the following expression for the expected futur inﬂation:
Etπt+1 = E (β0)ρεt, (14)
and then applying (14) into (12) yields
πt =
θ
(a2φ + 1)θ − φ
(1 + E (β0)ρ)εt. (15)
Comparing the above equation with (13), we can derive the following expression:
β0 =
θ
(a2φ + 1)θ − φ
(1 + E (β0)ρ). (16)
To calculate the expected value of the coeﬃcient β0, we take expectations across
expression (16)
E (β0) = E

θ
(a2φ + 1)θ − φ

(1 + E (β0)ρ). (17)
Using a second order Taylor series expansion in the above equation and replacing the
expression E (β0) into (16), we obtain the solution for β0:
β0 =
θ
(a2φ + 1)θ − φ
G3
G3 − ρ(¯ θG2 + φ(a2φ + 1)2σ2
θ)
(18)
where G = (a2φ + 1) ¯ θ − φ.
So, the complete solution of the model is given by
πt =
θ
(a2φ + 1)θ − φ
G3
G3 − ρ(¯ θG2 + φ(a2φ + 1)2σ2
θ)
εt, (19)
2See full description in ?).
4xt = −
aφθ
(a2φ + 1)θ − φ
G3





(a2φ + 1)θ − φ
G3
G3 − ρ(¯ θG2 + φ(a2φ + 1)2σ2
θ)
εt. (21)
The central bank faces a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output stabilization. In the
case of a positive cost-push shock εt > 0, output will be contracted and inﬂation will be
raised. In our model, the misspeciﬁcation term ht is considered as an endogenous variable
that worsens the inﬂation deviations. The worst scenario here is represented by ht, a
second type of shock which strengthens the positive cost-push shock.
From (19), we derive the expected future inﬂation:
Etπt+1 =
¯ θG2 + φ(a2φ + 1)σ2
θ
G3 − ρ
¯ θG2 + φ(a2φ + 1)σ2
θ
ρεt. (22)
In a general case, as a positive cost-push shock (i.e. εt > 0) hits the economy, the
private agents will anticipate an increase in the inﬂation rate. In order to ensure Etπt+1 >
0, we require that G3 − ρ¯ θG2 − φ(a2φ + 1)σ2









To some extend, this inequality allows us to deﬁne an upper bound of the degree of central
bank’s opacity σ2
θ.
According to (22) and (9), we obtain the expected future output gap as:
Etxt+1 = −aφEtπt+1 = −aφ
¯ θG2 + φ(a2φ + 1)σ2
θ
G3 − ρ
¯ θG2 + φ(a2φ + 1)σ2
θ
ρεt. (24)
3 Transparency and macroeconomic performance
It is of interest to investigate how the lack of transparency about central bank’s preference
for robustness aﬀects the macroeconomic variables. At a ﬁrst stage, we analyze the impact
of greater opacity on inﬂation expectations variability. Thus, we derive the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 Greater central bank opacity about its preference for robustness induces
higher variability of expected future inﬂation.









¯ θG2 + φ(a2φ + 1)σ2
θ
	2. (25)
Unambiguously, the sign of the above expression is positive.
Future inﬂationary expectations are increased due to the uncertainty about the central
bank’s preference for robustness. Therefore, if the central bank shares more information
5on its preferences with private agents, the latter tends to reduce their inﬂationary expec-
tations.
We now analyse the impact of opacity on output gap expectations. Higher expected
future inﬂation, induced by a higher level of opacity about the central bank’s preference for
robustness, leads to a larger fall in expected future output. Consequently, the variability





−aφ2 (a2φ + 1)ρG3

G3 − ρ
¯ θG2 + φ(a2φ + 1)σ2
θ
	2. (26)
The above equation allows us to get the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Greater central bank opacity about preference for robustness induces higher
variability of expected future output gap.





Concerning the impact of central bank’s opacity on current inﬂation and output gap,
we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 3 An increase in central bank’s opacity about preference for robustness leads
to higher variability of inﬂation and output gap.







(a2φ + 1)θ − φ
G3φρ(a2φ + 1)2
(G3 − ρθG2 − φρ(a2φ + 1)2σ2
θ)2 < 0. (28)







(a2φ + 1)θ − φ
G3φρ(a2φ + 1)2
(G3 − ρθG2 − φρ(a2φ + 1)2σ2
θ)2 > 0. (29)
Greater preference uncertainty leads to a more aggressive response from the private
agents. It induces higher variation of the current output as the latter depends positively
on expected future output gap (cf.(2)). Therefore, current inﬂation will be stabilised at the
price of larger falls in output gap when facing positive cost-push shocks. As a consequence,
the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ is worsened. In other words, uncertainty about central
bank’s preference for robustness strengthens the impact of the shock to the economy.
This result is in accordance with the literature studying central bank transparency in the
absence of model uncertainty.
64 Concluding remarks
In our paper, we addressed the issue of central bank transparency in a New Keynesian
framework where the central bank does not know the true structure of the economy.
We examined the impacts of opacity concerning central bank preference about model
robustness on macroeconomic performance. First, we showed that the higher the variance
of the central bank’s preference shock σ2
θ , the higher the inﬂation expectations. Second,
future output gap expectations vary more with higher opacity about the central bank’s
preference for robustness. Finally, when the central bank reveals less information about
its preference for robustness there is an increase in the variability of inﬂation and output
gap.
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